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Abstract 
West Virginia’s Voluntary Nonopioid Advance Directive: Ethical and Practical Concerns 
 
Kevin Augusto Rivera, M.A. 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
The West Virginia voluntary nonopioid advance directive (VNOAD) is a document 
indicating a person’s advance refusal of any discussion, offer, or administration of opioids by 
a healthcare provider. This thesis argues that, despite the worthy legislative intent behind its 
implementation in West Virginia—namely, to address the opioid epidemic by reducing the 
prescribing of opioids—the VNOAD not only fails to address the epidemic and its underlying 
etiology, but also presents multiple ethical and practical concerns. Because it neither requires 
discussion with a clinician, nor even the involvement and consent of the person to whom it 
applies, the VNOAD is contrary to the requirements and ethical values of informed consent. 
Because the VNOAD, once executed, prevents clinicians from discussing opioids with the 
patient, it undermines ideals of transparent clinician-patient communication and can prevent 
patients from receiving standard of care and from having their healthcare needs met. For 
clinicians, a patient’s executed VNOAD can give rise to distress and exposure to legal liability. 
This thesis discusses these ethical and practical concerns. 
The introduction recounts the origin of the VNOAD in West Virginia and presents the 
structure of the thesis. The second section analyzes the VNOAD in comparison to traditional 
advance directives and physicians’ orders regarding life sustaining treatment, as well as the 
notion of a Ulysses contract. The third section presents the ethical and practical problems 
presented by the VNOAD as it has been designed and implemented in West Virginia, though 
 v 
the problems likely afflict most NOADs. These problems include undermining physician-
patient communication and informed consent, not respecting patient autonomy, not serving the 
health interests of patients, and risking distress on the part of patients, their family members, 
and clinicians. The fourth section suggests what might be done to address some of these 
problems. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 The Nonopioid Advance Directive and its Implementation in West Virginia 
On March 9, 2018, West Virginia Senate Bill 273, the Opioid Reduction Act, was passed, 
and went into effect 90 days later. It was introduced at the request of Governor Jim Justice (West 
Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 2018). Among its provisions—including, 
opioid prescription limitations, chronic pain clinic referral policy, required reporting of abnormal 
prescribing practices, and drug scheduling—the bill provided that the Office of Drug Control 
Policy, which had been created in 2017, establish a voluntary nonopioid advanced directive 
(VNOAD) form. The West Virginia VNOAD was included under article 54, and the form appears 
to be a wholesale borrowing from Massachusetts’ form (Satkoske, 2019). The form, which is to 
be filed in an individual’s medical record, may be used to “indicate to a health care practitioner 
that an individual may not be administered or offered a prescription or medication order for an 
opioid” (West Virginia-ARTICLE 54, SECTION 16-54-2 subsection b). (Though I discuss below 
reasons that the WV VNOAD should not be termed an advance directive in the traditional sense, 
here I note that the term used in the WV legislation and form is also erroneous. ARTICLE 54. 
OPIOID REDUCTION ACT. §16-54-2 refers to a “voluntary nonopioid advanced directive form,” 
while the proper term would include ‘advance’ not ‘advanced’.) 
Legislators in different states (e.g., Connecticut and Alaska), and their residents currently 
suffering from substance use disorder (SUD), have become interested in the execution of 
nonopioid advance directives (NOADs) (Associated Press, 2017). For clarity, VNOAD will be the 
acronym used when talking specifically about the West Virginia document and NOAD will be 
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used when talking about this type of advance directive in other states or in general terms. By 
executing a NOAD a person refuses discussion, offer, or administration of opioids, even when 
such drugs are medically indicated. The main population intended to use the VNOAD are 
individuals with substance use disorder (SUD), who may execute a NOAD as part of their 
treatment plan to manage their disorder. However, one may also imagine some people without 
SUD seeking to execute a NOAD with the belief that it will help them avoid developing addiction, 
perhaps, partially because of the attention opioid addiction has received and because of the stigma 
associated with addiction and opioid use.  
In West Virginia, the introduction of Senate Bill 273 was prompted by a desire to reduce 
the rate of deaths due to overdoses in West Virginia, which had the highest rate of any state in 
2016 at 52.0 per 100,000 people. At the time, that rate was projected to increase by 2017, so the 
government chose to respond with this bill and include the implementation of the VNOAD (Rice, 
J.C. & Power, M.L., 2018). The bill came after a strong wave of bipartisan support to curtail the 
opioid epidemic, and its high death toll, demonstrated by the passage of the federal Opioid Crisis 
Response Act of 2018 (Facher, L., 2018). As US Representative from West Virginia  Shelly Moore 
Capito said, “When thinking about ‘next steps’ for fighting the opioid epidemic, one of the first 
things I realized was that the formula for state funding was not providing adequate resources to 
the hardest hit states; and I worked to make sure that funding formula was changed.” Now as a US 
Senator, Capito reported that, at the time she supported the bill so that small states with the highest 
rates of opioid overdose could get more aid (Capito, 2018). West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin 
made similar statements at the time. He stated, “West Virginia has the highest overdose rate per 
capita of any state in our nation and the impacts of this epidemic can be felt [by] every[one] [in] 
our state… [The bill’s] language more than tripled the amount of funding coming to our state.” 
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Initially, state funding received through the Opioid Crisis Response Act was based solely upon the 
number of opioid related deaths per state, rather than opioid death rates per capita. Language based 
on per capita rate rather than absolute number of deaths more clearly reflects, given its small 
population, the degree to which WV has been affected by the opioid crisis, especially when 
compared with other states (Manchin, 2018). 
In response to a request for information regarding the efficacy of the VNOAD, the West 
Virginia Bureau for Public Health (WVBPH) stated (erroneously) that the information is protected 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Common 
Rule governing research (42 CFR 2). (Disclosure of aggregate data would not, in fact, violate either 
HIPAA or 42 CFR 2.) Therefore, information like the association between implementation of the 
law and the number of opioid prescriptions being written or filled, or the number of individuals 
being diagnosed with substance use disorder (SUD), is not available. De-identified or aggregate 
data has also not been collected to their knowledge, perhaps due to the difficulty of doing so 
because of concern for privacy rights and individuals’ concerns about revealing that they have 
employed a VNOAD. Additionally, the WVBPH expressed doubt that any meaningful data 
analysis existed and reported that no current raw data had been collected to test whether the intent 
had been successfully supported by the VNOAD. Moreover, simply learning whether the rate of 
opioid prescription has been significantly reduced in WV since the introduction of the VNOAD 
will not demonstrate a direct effect of the document; at most there could be an association between 
the document’s introduction and prescription rates. The number of opioid prescriptions being 
written and/or filled is influenced by many factors. 
The implementation of the VNOAD demonstrates the state’s interest in promoting the 
general welfare of its citizens. However, it remains an open question whether the execution of the 
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document by an individual, leads to positive effects for the person utilizing it and indeed whether 
its general use reduces the incidence of opioid-related SUD and overdose deaths. Presumably, 
West Virginia’s Governor, Jim Justice, who introduced the bill with the VNOAD provision, and 
those who supported it, believe in the potential the document has to achieve positive outcomes.  
1.2 Overview of This Paper’s Goal and Structure 
This paper will focus on the Voluntary NOAD currently available in West Virginia and its 
possible effects on different populations; the paper will also address aspects of other state’s similar 
directives when relevant. It will analyze the ethical considerations involved in employing NOADs 
and will argue against the use of NOADs for several reasons. First, VNOADs interfere with 
physician—patient communication. Second, the creation of the VNOAD and subsequent 
development of norms may lead to social pressures on patients to execute such documents. Third, 
because VNOADs focus on interventions, rather than patient goals and values, they suffer from 
the same failings as intervention-focused advance directives used to direct care during a patient’s 
decisional incapacity. Thus, it serves as a suboptimal means of achieving patient’s healthcare 
goals. The VNOAD may even prove detrimental for patients with SUD, as execution of a VNOAD 
may be too blunt an instrument to achieve their goals and may not promote their health-related 
well-being. Fourth, there are issues surrounding the revocation of a VNOAD. The process for 
revocation and reasons supporting revocation, including conditions warranting automatic 
revocation or nullification of the document, are not clearly delineated. Failure to enable revocation 
could also lead to patient distress, undermine patient quality of life, patient autonomy, and is 
contrary to the requirements of informed consent. Fifth, the VNOAD will likely lead to physician 
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distress, as physicians struggle between seeing patients in pain and the legal liability they would 
incur if they were to violate the VNOAD’s prohibition of discussion of opioids. Sixth, family 
distress may also arise when a loved one has a terminal condition, is in severe pain, and has a 
VNOAD that prevents adequate palliative care. Seventh, issues and questions of how appropriate 
the VNOAD is to West Virginia’s population will be analyzed. The final section will discuss the 
ill effects the VNOAD may have on other populations who employ the document—namely, 
patient’s with opioid allergies and patients with deep fear of addiction but no SUD. 
This paper’s analysis will unfold within a total of five sections. Section 2 compares the 
VNOAD to traditional advance directives, the POST, and the Ulysses contract. Section 3 outlines 
and discusses the VNOAD’s ethical and practical concerns. Section 4 suggests how some of these 
problems could be mitigated. Section 5 concludes that the VNOAD is a poor tool and summaries 
interventions that could improve it and its use. 
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2.0 Comparison of VNOAD to Other Instruments for Directing Care 
2.1 Traditional Advance Directives 
A healthcare advance directive is an oral or written statement of a person’s wishes for her 
or his medical treatment that becomes effective when a clinician deems a patient to lack decision-
making capacity in the relevant domain. Lacking decision-making capacity or being deemed 
incompetent “denotes those who are to be placed under the guidance and control of another… [In 
that case,] information will be provided to a third party authorized to decide on the incompetent’s 
behalf, and the decision will be reached by that party” (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). Generally, 
advance directives are created by people to ensure that their future medical treatment, if and when 
they become incompetent, aligns with their values. In this manner, the advance directive plays a 
role in the decision-making process, along with the third party. The three types of directives that 
will be discussed are: oral statements (and informal written comments), the Living Will, and the 
Durable Power of Attorney (Meisel, 1992). 
Advance directives are most ethically justifiable when they are goal-oriented, rather than 
intervention-specific, because they allow for flexibility in their future application in light of 
changing health conditions, technologies, and intervention modalities, while implementing the 
patient’s persistent values and care goals. In order to be optimally ethically justified and effective, 
advance directive documents should: (i) name a surrogate decision maker, and (ii) state goals and 
values that should ideally inform the surrogate decisionmaker’s decision-making. Advance 
directives are considered valid when they have been executed by an individual who is reasonably 
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informed, acting voluntarily in issuing them, and competent to make decisions about the future 
care they would like to receive if deemed incompetent (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). 
Medical decisions made by competent patients at the time when a medical need presents 
itself are the most likely to reflect the patients’ values. Because they are written in advance of their 
need, advance directives likely speak to scenarios or interventions with imperfect contextualization 
to the present situation. An advance directive that is updated when changes in the author’s values 
or medical condition occur should be considered to have the strongest authority as it is most likely 
to reflect current values of the patient-author. Such directives would best serve patient wishes and 
best guide a surrogate decision-maker in mirroring contemporaneous patient decision-making. 
Naming a surrogate decision-maker, as well as stating goals and values along with relevant 
updating, promote the patient’s precedent-autonomy and well-being. 
In cases where explicit statements have not been recorded in writing regarding specific 
medical care interventions, prior oral statements (heard by family or a close friend) regarding the 
relevant health state or intervention can be used to inform patient care when the patient is deemed 
incompetent. Relying on oral advance directives may raise questions about accuracy of the 
surrogate’s reporting, as well as questions about how carefully considered a patient’s previous oral 
comment may have been. Written advance directives provide a fixed statement to be interpreted, 
and the act of writing instructions or executing legal documents demonstrates some degree of 
seriousness on the part of the patient. 
A living will is an instructional advance directive; it is a document expressing explicit 
wishes of the patient regarding end-of-life care. Following a living will respects a patient’s 
autonomy by implementing the patient’s own wishes regarding healthcare, and presumably 
promotes the patient’s well-being as she or he conceives it. Relying on a living will may also 
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facilitate timely decision-making and alleviate doubt healthcare agents or family may have had in 
making those decisions had there not been a living will. The drawback is that a living will without 
declaration of a proxy is not very flexible in responding to medical scenarios not encompassed by 
the document; implementation of the living will may benefit from a proxy contextualizing the 
wishes to the particular scenario.  
Another advance directive is a Durable Health Care Power of Attorney or Medical Power 
of Attorney (MPOA), as it is called in West Virginia. This is a legal document that names a 
surrogate decision maker for purposes of healthcare decision-making. Like the living will, it comes 
into effect if the individual is incapacitated and requires medical care decisions to be made to direct 
care. The person named as a surrogate in a MPOA is responsible for guiding care so that it aligns 
with any instructional advance directives or, more generally with the patient’s values, and for 
making decisions not already clear from explicit prior statements or written direction (Mayo 
Clinic, 2014). The surrogate must interpret the instructional advance directive and contextualize it 
to the present circumstance or employ substituted judgment to construct what the patient would 
want, based on what is known about the patient’s values and preferences. According to Beauchamp 
and Childress, “the standard of substituted judgement should be used for once-competent patients 
only if reason exists to believe that the surrogate decision maker can make a judgement as the 
patient would have made it. In such cases, the surrogate should have such a deep and relevant 
familiarity with the patient that the particular judgement made reflects the patient’s views and 
values” (2009, pp. 117-120). If the patient’s likely preference cannot be discerned, then the 
surrogate must make decisions that are in the patient’s best interests. In contrast to the substituted 
judgment standard, the best interest standard in decision-making is not predicated on the patient’s 
 9 
values but is based on the culture’s generally accepted values and views of what is conducive to 
quality of life. 
These advance directive documents allow those employing them—a physician 
implementing a living will or a surrogate decision maker named in a MPOA—to contextualize the 
directive to the current scenario, treatment options, and decisions to be made. Insofar as the 
advance directive states the patient’s values, priorities, and goals of care, the surrogate may truly 
apply the patient’s values in selecting treatment. In contrast, advance directives that are purely 
intervention-focused—for example, a series of checkboxes asking the patient to consent/refuse 
antibiotics, CPR, mechanical ventilation—are less useful for constructing what the patient would 
want, where he or she competent, in specific circumstances. Because every medical scenario is 
unique, there is a high risk that the patient would not have been able to take all relevant information 
into account in framing an intervention-focused advance directive. Therefore, an ideal instructional 
advance directive would be goal-oriented, as opposed to strictly intervention-oriented. 
Furthermore, updating advance directives enable a person to reassess how well the directives align 
with her/his current life circumstances and values, and then either change or reaffirm their content. 
2.2 Comparison of the VNOAD to Traditional Advance Directives 
The West Virginia VNOAD differs from traditional advance directives in several ethically 
relevant ways. First, the VNOAD (see figure 1) need not be executed by the patient while 
competent but may instead be completed by a patient’s guardian or health care agent, apparently 
without the patient being consulted or concurring. Unlike traditional advance directives, the 
 10 
VNOAD need not be the result of a patient’s autonomous authorization. In this way, the VNOAD 
fails to respect or promote patient autonomy. 
Second, unlike traditional advance directives, the VNOAD seems to be effective—i.e., to 
guide the patient’s care—whether or not the patient is competent to make decisions for him/herself 
at the time such care guidance is needed. The VNOAD is effective upon signing, and while it may 
be revoked at any time, it is intended to constrain healthcare professionals from that point forward 
from even discussing opioids. While healthcare professionals are not prohibited by the VNOAD 
from asking the patient about the existence of the VNOAD to ascertain that the patient still affirms 
its provisions, it is perhaps likely that healthcare professionals will be reluctant to make that inquiry 
once they are aware that a patient has a VNOAD. They may confuse discussing opioids and 
discussing the VNOAD, and mistakenly believe they are prohibited from raising either in 
discussion. They may not want to engage with a patient’s SUD, which they may assume a patient 
has simply because the patient has a VNOAD. Stigma surrounding opioid use and SUD may make 
it difficult for a patient with a NOAD to revoke it or to have that revocation taken seriously. The 
possibility that the VNOAD’s provisions would lead to the overriding of a competent patient’s 
contemporaneous decision-making (e.g., a request for pain medication) is contrary to respect for 
patient autonomy and may be contrary to the patient’s well-being. 
Third, the VNOAD does not state a patient’s goals for care or values, or even her/his 
preferences, except to state that the patient prefers not to be offered opioids. The document does 
not state the specific goals the patient sought through its execution and may prevent exploration 
of those goals by prohibiting the discussion of opioids. Awareness of patient goals helps orient 
healthcare teams and enables development to care plans. The VNOAD’s singular goal of 
prohibiting discussion and prescription of opioids can conflict with unstated patient goals, as 
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managing their care and even managing SUD may not necessitate complete avoidance of opiates.  
By failing to include any opportunity to state goals and values, but instead focusing on the single 
intervention of opioid prescription/administration, the VNOAD does not respect patient autonomy 
and promote well-being in the way that traditional advance directives attempt to balance patient 
self-determination and well-being (Buchanan and Brock, 1989). 
Even for the patient who is executing the document on his or her own behalf, the extent of 
what the patient is refusing by signing a VNOAD depends on comma usage within the sentence 
previously discussed. The sentence reads: “I <state your name> certify that I am refusing at my 
own insistence the offer or administration of any opioid medications including in an emergency 
situation where I am unable to speak for myself.” This could mean the patient refuses  
a) offer or administration of opioids[,] including in an emergency situation[,] where I am 
unable to speak for myself. This means that the patient should not be offered/administered opioids 
in any situation so long as the patient cannot speak for him/herself at that time, and this includes 
in emergency situations. If this is the correct reading, then the patient’s refusal by means of the 
VNOAD is only effective when the patient cannot speak for him/herself. On this reading, the 
sentence could be rewritten as: “I <state your name> certify that I am refusing at my own insistence 
the offer or administration of any opioid medications where I am unable to speak for myself, 
including in an emergency situation.” 
b) offer or administration of opioids[,] including in an emergency situation where I am 
unable to speak for myself. This means that the patient refuses the offer or administration of 
opioids and should not be offered/administered opioids; further, it is emphasized that this applies 
to emergencies when the patient cannot speak for him/herself. If this is the correct reading, then 
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the patient’s refusal by means of the VNOAD is effective in any situation—whether or not the 
patient can speak for him/herself, and whether or not it is an emergency.  
While interpretation (a) would be more respectful of patient autonomy, it appears that the 
VNOAD is commonly used during times of competence, and not only at times of incompetence, 
as would be implied by the fact that it also denies discussion of opioid administration with the 
patient, a scenario unlikely to need delineating if the patient is always expected to be incompetent 
at the time the healthcare professional follows the VNOAD. 
Fourth, the VNOAD does not contemplate particular medical circumstances in which 
opioids may be medically indicated or provide nuanced guidance; it simply seeks to prevent opioid 
use. There are justifiable uses of opioids, such as palliative measures toward the end of life, 
immensely painful emergency scenarios, therapeutic opioid use for SUD treatment, and pain 
secondary to cancer or other conditions in which the pain is not controllable by other nonopioid 
interventions. End-of-life care is a circumstance in which pain should be treated—with opioids, if 
necessary—without concern about a patient’s history of SUD, active SUD, or concern for 
development of SUD, unless the dying patient genuinely does not want opioids and expresses that 
preference. An active VNOAD would prevent administration of opioids in these circumstances, if 
the patient is not competent to revoke it, or if the guardian or healthcare representative is not 
present or is unwilling to do so.  
Relatedly, the VNOAD also does not appoint a surrogate who could use the patient’s 
preference not to be given opioids as guidance for contemporaneous decision-making regarding 
opioids in a particular circumstance. Even a surrogate named in a MPOA is not permitted to 
contextualize the VNOAD to situations to allow use of opioids in some cases, but not others. The 
VNOAD cannot be used to engage in circumstance-specific balancing in the way that a surrogate, 
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appointed by the patient through a MPOA can exercise judgment when interpreting the patient’s 
living will. Instead the surrogate can only revoke or fail to revoke the NOAD, just as the patient 
can do, because the document does not allow for contextualization of patient preferences to the 
patient’s current medical needs.  
The VNOAD does apparently allow for the surrogate to revoke the document, but in this 
regard the document’s language is again confusing. The document has a surrogate sign as if the 
surrogate were executing his or her own VNOAD: “I <state your name> □ guardian/health care 
agent certify that I am refusing at my own insistence the offer or administration of any opioid 
medications including in an emergency situation where I am unable to speak for myself.” This is 
strange, as the guardian or health agent appears to be talking about his or her own refusal. The 
structure of the sentence, with its “I-language,” implies that the powers granted to the patient are 
also given to the guardian or health care agent. These would include the ability to execute and to 
revoke the document. This ambiguity should be addressed by West Virginia, because, as written, 
the sentence does not make sense with the result that it is unclear under what conditions the refusal 
is effective. It seems that the document controls care of the patient when the surrogate is unable to 
speak for him/herself. 
 14 
 
Figure 1 VNOAD Image 
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Figure 1 VNOAD Image (continued) 
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Figure 1 VNOAD Image (continued) 
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2.3 West Virginia Physician Orders for Scope of Treatment 
The West Virginia Physician Orders for Scope of Treatment (POST) differs from advance 
directives in that it is a medical order. The POST is an order by a physician, completed after 
conversation with the person completing the form. A physician’s signature (or a/n PA/APRN’s 
signature in WV) validates the orders. The POST is portable, i.e., it is supposed to “travel with” 
the patient to all healthcare settings, for example, from hospital to nursing facility, to the patient’s 
home to the Emergency Department. 
The POST may include orders regarding resuscitation, intubation, antibiotic and general 
pharmaceutical usage, nutrition and hydration interventions, the desired place to be treated, and 
can identify an authorized surrogate. The patient, or the patient’s previously designated surrogate 
holding a MPOA, or in some cases a guardian, provides a signature to make the orders effective 
and, of greatest ethical importance, to demonstrate he or she was part of the conversation leading 
to the orders and agrees that the orders listed are in accordance with the patient’s values and wishes. 
The POST is intervention-focused, rather than goals-of-care-focused, but a POST form is to be 
completed only near the end of life, so the medical circumstances contemplated by the orders are 
more circumscribed than an advance directive executed at possibly a great length of time before 
presentation of illness. Like an advance directive, the POST can be updated if the patient’s 
circumstances do change, though the WV POST form (see figure 2), for example, states that 
updating of the orders should be sought if “time permits” following a change in medical condition. 
The POST, and other states’ variations of it, was developed by patient advocates who felt 
that the best way to protect a patient’s interests at the end of life was to incorporate a patient’s 
healthcare decisions within a physician’s medical order. Experience shows that POSTs (or other 
iterations of the same document) are more likely to be honored in the healthcare setting than are 
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advance directives, as the orders—being physician orders—are more widely applicable throughout 
different medical environments (Furrow, et al., 2018, pg. 377). The general consensus with 
research conducted on the POST appears to prove the POST to be more effective in having patient 
end-of-life wishes being honored. In example, in a retrospective cohort study of 2,027 West 
Virginians, the study researched whether an AD or POST was more effective in achieving an out-
of-hospital death (OHD) for patients in hospice. Patients with only advance directives had an OHD 
56.9% of the time as opposed to patients with a POST form with either limited or full intervention 
orders who had an OHD 88.4% and 75.9% of the time, respectively (Pedraza, et al., 2016). As 
noted previously, the effectiveness of the VNOAD is apparently not being tracked by the WVBPH. 
In West Virginia, the POST document, or similar documents in other states, is currently 
used predominantly by the elderly and principally in skilled nursing facilities. In fact, in some 
skilled nursing facilities, the mandatory offer of the POST may be misinterpreted as mandating 
completion of the POST by all their patients: 
“A number of states require hospitals or long-term care facilities to offer POLST to certain 
groups of patients. This requirement parallels the duty under the Patient Self-Determination Act 
(PSDA) to ‘provide written information ... concerning . . . right to formulate advance directives.’ 
For example, Maryland requires that completion of its MOLST form be offered to patients in 
assisted living and nursing facilities, hospices, home health agencies, and dialysis centers, as well 
as to hospital inpatients being transferred to long-term care. Utah requires a similar range of 
facilities to determine, on admission, whether each individual has a POLST. These facilities must 
determine which individuals without a POLST should be offered the opportunity to complete one. 
Such requirements encourage widespread clinical implementation of POLST, but surveys of states 
and facilities implementing POLST raise concerns that healthcare facilities, especially nursing 
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homes, misinterpret ‘mandatory offer’ to mean all residents must have a POLST form.” (Pope, 
T.M., & Hexum, M. 2012).  
The Nursing Home Model Policy for the WV POST, posted on West Virginia University’s 
Center for Health Ethics and Law page, explicitly states that the POST cannot be mandated by 
anyone but rather is strictly voluntary (WVU Center for Health Ethics and Law, accessed 2019). 
Any requirement that a person complete a POST form would be contrary to promotion of the 
patient’s rights of self-determination. 
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Figure 2 West Virginia POST Image 
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Figure 2 West Virginia POST Image (continued) 
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2.4 Comparison of the POST and the VNOAD 
The POST and VNOAD have instructive, ethically relevant similarities and differences. 
Though the VNOAD is not a physician’s order, by law it is to be included in the patient’s medical 
record and is to be signed by a patient’s healthcare provider. Both documents are designed to be 
portable and implemented within all settings of healthcare including an Emergency Department, 
skilled nursing facility, rehabilitation facility, and outside the healthcare setting to direct EMS care 
in the prehospital setting. 
Both the VNOAD and the POST can be executed on behalf of a patient by a surrogate—
perhaps without the patient’s knowledge or without taking the patient’s values into account. 
Though, most importantly, in contrast to the VNOAD, a surrogate can only execute the POST if 
the patient is incompetent. Notably, that surrogate must have been appointed by the patient while 
the patient was competent. The West Virginia Nursing Home Model Policy notes that the POST 
may only be completed by the resident patient, if the patient still has capacity. In contrast, it is not 
clear whether a surrogate or guardian could execute a VNOAD on behalf of a competent person; 
it appears that this may be possible. Both documents are immediately effective or actionable. Thus, 
it is especially problematic that the VNOAD could be executed without a competent person’s 
knowledge. 
2.5 Examination of the VNOAD as a Type of Ulysses Contract   
A Ulysses contract is meant to help an individual achieve particular goals despite external 
or internal pressures. The concept of a Ulysses contract derives from the story of Ulysses, who is 
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also known as Odysseus in Greek mythology. During his voyage, Ulysses is curious to hear the 
music of the Sirens, but those who heard the Siren songs never survived. He instructs his crew to 
put beeswax in their ears to avoid hearing the music, and to tie him down tightly to the mast of the 
boat, so that he would not need to wear beeswax to avoid being lured by the Sirens’ music to steer 
the ship onto rocks. He knew he would hear their music, lose control, and beg his crew to let him 
free, thus leading him to steer the ship, fatally, onto the rocks. As a result of this knowledge, he 
makes a pact with the crew that his contemporaneous stated wishes are to be ignored until he is no 
longer enamored by the Sirens, until his mind is clear and he again reasons as his authentic self 
and not a sailor under the influence of the Sirens’ songs. Due to being tied up, Ulysses was able to 
both hear the sirens and remain on deck; the ship survived having its captain hear the Sirens’ songs. 
The ethical justification for the conceptual Ulysses contract is that the current competent, 
authentic-self executes a Ulysses contract to constrain his or her future behavior when she or he is 
not competent or is being unduly pressured resulting in him or her not acting voluntarily in 
accordance with his/her authentic values. 
In healthcare, this quasi-contract is designed to empower a proxy to override present 
requests by the patient, even if he or she is considered legally competent, through the document’s 
previously agreed upon orders (signed into effect by the patient when clearly competent) (Spellecy, 
2004). This type of contract may be used in mental healthcare for those suffering from conditions 
such as mania and schizophrenia. For example, a patient with schizophrenia whose condition is 
currently controlled by anti-psychotics can sign this contract agreeing to be hospitalized if he or 
she were to begin hallucinating, perhaps due to medication non-compliance. In the case of patients 
who have SUD, a Ulysses contract would specify behaviors that likely indicate active substance 
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use by the individual signing the contract. The contract would then specify that another individual 
should intervene in some way, perhaps by committing the person to a treatment facility. 
If executed by a competent patient, a NOAD can be viewed as a type of Ulysses contract. 
While a Ulysses contract is generally not legally binding—Arizona is the only state to have 
something similar to a Ulysses contract be legally recognized (Spellecy, R., 2004)—a NOAD is 
legally binding in all states in which they have been created. By executing the contract, the person 
tries to constrain his or her future behavior (i.e., opioid consumption); however, unlike the Ulysses 
contract the NOAD constrains the healthcare professional’s behavior. Like other Ulysses contracts, 
a NOAD would be executed by a person when competent and would become effective 
immediately. Unlike the typical Ulysses contract, the NOAD would constrain future actions of 
others, rather than the person executing the NOAD (e.g., recommendations and prescribing by 
healthcare professionals). Like the Ulysses contract, the NOAD would be effective whether or not 
the patient was competent at the future time contemplated and would function to override the 
patient’s stated preferences at that time.  
In some ways, NOADs are similar to opioid contracts executed between a patient with 
SUD and his or her clinician. Opioid contracts, however, are executed in the course of SUD 
treatment between treating clinicians and the patient, and specify particular consequences that will 
follow from particular patient behaviors (e.g., unprescribed resumption of opioid use). While they 
are designed to constrain the behavior of patients with SUD and describe clinician behavioral 
responses to proscribed behaviors, they do not seek to prevent the medically indicated prescribing 
of opioids. Daniel Buchman and Anita Ho (2013) comment on opioid contracts as creating an 
adversarial environment that could harm the physician-patient therapeutic relationship. The 
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VNOAD, or NOADs in general, may lead to similar adversarial interactions and may preempt 
therapeutically useful interactions to achieve trusting communication and adequate pain relief. 
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3.0 An Examination of the VNOAD’s Ethical Shortcomings 
3.1 Interference with Physician-Patient Communication and Informed Consent 
The VNOAD undermines the goal of transparency in healthcare communication for 
patients who execute them. The VNOAD is designed not only to prevent healthcare professionals 
from administering opioids, but also from discussing opioids as a treatment option for those who 
have executed a VNOAD. The VNOAD thus prevents fulfillment of the information requirement 
of both informed consent and prevents provision of standard of care, which is contrary to patients’ 
health-related well-being. What exacerbates these ethical concerns even further is the fact that a 
physician consultation is not necessary to execute a VNOAD; a physician need only sign it to 
certify it has been included in the patient’s medical record. 
One may think that because patients already know that opioids will not be discussed, if 
they have employed a VNOAD, that there is sufficient transparency in the patient’s future medical 
encounters and disclosure during the informed consent process. Such a belief is false on two 
counts. First, the patient’s surrogate may have executed the document without the patient’s 
knowledge. Second, even if the patient executed the VNOAD her/himself, there may have been a 
lack of informed consent, in so far as the patient may not have realized the range of conditions in 
which treatment with opioids would have been standard of care, but would not be discussed, 
offered, or administered because of the valid VNOAD. Discussion with a healthcare professional 
is important in order to identify the patient’s reasoning in seeking to execute a VNOAD—
including understanding not only what a VNOAD is, but also what it entails—as well as to ensure 
that the patient is voluntarily executing the VNOAD. Of course, because the patient need not be 
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involved—a guardian or healthcare agent may execute the VNOAD—there is actually no 
requirement that the patient give informed consent to its implementation.   
3.2 Social Pressures and Concern for the Voluntary Informed Consent to VNOADs 
As the VNOAD is publicized and becomes more commonplace it is possible that people, 
particularly those with SUD, will sense an increased pressure to sign one into effect. Patients with 
SUD and without a VNOAD may be (mistakenly) seen as not making their strongest effort to 
recover. Two wrongful harms are involved. First, extrinsic pressures to comply with pressure to 
execute a VNOAD is contrary to informed consent, and refusal of medical interventions that may 
be appropriate is contrary to patient well-being. Second, increased stigmatization of SUD patients 
not only for their condition, but also their lack of a VNOAD, would be wrong and contrary to their 
recovery. With increased acceptance and popularity of NOADs, there may be increased risk of 
rehabilitation facilities implementing their execution as a requirement of treatment, exerting 
pressure on patients to execute them, or “firing” patients who refuse. This would be detrimental to 
the health of those patients, contrary to the public health goal of increasing SUD rehabilitation, 
and contrary to respect for patient autonomy and the voluntariness requirement of informed 
consent. 
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3.3 The VNOAD as Contrary to Patient Well-being and Justice 
The VNOAD is a suboptimal means of achieving the goals of patients with SUD who 
employ the document to avoid relapse for several reasons. First, it is only specific to the medical 
setting. Even after executing a VNOAD, patients with SUD can still pursue opioids outside of the 
healthcare setting, perhaps seeking even more dangerous opioid options such as heroin. 
Importantly, “four out of five heroin addicts come to the drugs… through prescribed opioids” 
(Bruder, 2018). Unfortunately, the VNOAD does not get at the true etiology of opioid misuse, as 
it is only a tool to deter prescribing of opioids to patients. Patients with active SUD still remain 
with down regulated dopamine receptors in the brain, a lessened sense of pleasure, learned drug 
seeking habits, and extreme cravings from past drug experiences that motivate them to find 
opioids. Brains may begin transitioning back to a state prior to drug use, but this can take time 
(Volkow & Morales, 2015). 
Second, within healthcare settings, opioid prescribing guidelines could achieve the results 
sought through the VNOAD, while still permitting judicious use of opioids when no other pain 
relief is effective. This is important for reasons of both well-being and justice. People with SUD 
have the same interest in pain relief that others do. According to Norman Daniels (2008), 
“Whatever our chosen goals or tasks, we need our health and, therefore, appropriate health care.” 
Though a person’s goals can change with changes in health, as Daniels points out, the degrees of 
freedom to flourish and pursue goals are reduced with diminished health. Because pain can impair 
an individual’s ability to function it reduces an individual’s health-related and overall well-being. 
The VNOAD with its absolute bar of opioid use does not promote health-related well-being.  
Moreover, contrary to the requirements of justice, the VNOAD may lead to the treatment 
of patients with SUD differently from other patients for irrelevant, and thus unjust reasons. Insofar 
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as they are encouraged or forced to have a NOAD to obtain SUD treatment, the imposition of this 
inappropriate an irrelevant barrier to treatment for their disorder is unfair. Insofar are their 
VNOAD prevents them from having appropriate, standard of care treatment for other conditions, 
like pain, the VNOAD leads to this injustice. 
Pain can not only be debilitating but can also lead to or exacerbate ill health. Untreated 
post-surgical pain, for example, can delay appropriate healing time (Erlenwein, et al., 2015). Of 
the people who have VNOADs due to their SUD, it is likely some may be on medication due to 
chronic pain, and while they may be able to get off of medication to keep substance free and 
withstand some discomfort, they may later sustain an injury, need surgery, or develop cancer, and 
now their level of pain would indicate opioid usage. Pre-existing or chronic pain is an established 
risk factor for severe postoperative pain: “a history of chronic pain was associated with slower 
postoperative mobilization, poorer physical function, and greater psychological distress in addition 
to increased postoperative pain intensity. The comorbidity of a chronic pain disorder resulted in 
greater pain intensity after surgery, and also impeded postoperative rehabilitation” (Erlenwein, et 
al., 2015). As a matter of justice, people with SUD have as much entitlement to effective pain 
management as those without the disorder. Acute pain control is an issue independent of the 
chronic issue of SUD, and both should be remedied. 
3.4 The VNOAD: Problems Surrounding Execution and Revocation  
Guidance in the law regarding the VNOAD’s implementation and revocation is so minimal 
as to be ethically inadequate. There is no clear requirement of counseling prior to executing a 
VNOAD. A patient may not understand its provisions or carefully consider reasons to execute the 
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document, and patients executing a VNOAD should be afforded the decision support, information, 
and rights associated with other medical decision-making, including the conditions for giving 
informed consent. 
It should be noted that some people mistakenly believe that people with SUD are 
specifically incompetent in regard to decisions involving opioids. People may have this mistaken 
belief for at least two reasons. First, they may think this because opioids may impair judgement 
and decision-making ability, and thus undermine the informed aspect of being able to give 
informed consent. Second, people may think that people with SUD may lack autonomy with regard 
to resisting craving for opioids and thus render them incapable of making voluntary decisions 
regarding the substances their diseases cause them to crave. If accurate, these views would, 
however, be contrary to the intended voluntary nature of the VNOAD. Embracing these views—
namely, of people with SUD as lacking autonomy or decisional capacity—would also undermine 
the rationale for allowing patients with SUD to execute VNOADs—namely, respect for patient 
autonomy. If people with SUD are considered incompetent to accept opioids why would they not 
also be considered incompetent to refuse opioids as well? Moreover, insofar as voluntary and 
active participation in treatment is a necessary feature of successful treatment for SUD, it would 
fail to be conducive to patient well-being to assume that people with SUD cannot make 
autonomous decisions regarding their care. 
Similarly, prior to executing the document, patients would likely want to know what their 
physicians would believe to be justifiable reasons to revoke a VNOAD, especially because once it 
has been signed into effect, it functions to prevent physicians from discussing opioids. Neither 
patients nor clinicians are provided guidance regarding how to facilitate revocation in situations 
where the patient already knows—at the time of executing the VNOAD—that she or he would like 
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the VNOAD to be revoked or nullified, for instance if the patient were to develop dementia, 
associated loss of decisional capacity, and extreme pain. Contemplating such a case, even a person 
who is currently very concerned about developing SUD or experiencing SUD relapse, may not 
care about the risk of active SUD or may prefer to trade-off that risk in favor of effective pain 
control. The document’s instructions do not indicate any way to establish conditions for automatic 
revocation of the executed VNOAD. 
3.5 Physician Distress and Legal Liability 
Physician distress is another potential negative byproduct of the VNOAD. In cases where 
a physician has strong reason to believe the patient could greatly benefit from opioids with minimal 
likelihood of resulting harm (i.e., acute pain in scenarios associated with emergency medical care), 
the VNOAD’s prevention of the discussion of opioid use may quite reasonably cause the physician 
(and other clinicians) distress. Physicians may especially experience distress when they know or 
suspect that the VNOAD was executed by someone else (a guardian or healthcare agent), and even 
more if it was done without the knowledge of the patient. While physicians may try to avoid a 
situation in which their patients do not know they have an active VNOAD, when this situation 
occurs, the physician’s hands are essentially tied. 
Physicians’ ethical obligations to prevent suffering and to obtain informed consent may 
conflict with their legal requirement to respect the provisions of a VNOAD. There are serious legal 
consequences from violating the VNOAD and mentioning, offering, or administering opioids. The 
VNOAD document explicitly states, “any violation of the act is grounds for disciplinary action… 
and may subject the health care practitioner to civil and criminal liability.” The law does not allow 
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healthcare providers to ensure for themselves that informed consent was acquired. In the 
contemporaneous context, the existence of the VNOAD prevents informed consent by preventing 
disclosure and recommendation of relevant treatment options, including opioid use. 
Additional sources of distress and legal liability also arise because patients may not know 
that opioids could be indicated to treat their pain (since VNOAD prevents their physician from 
disclosing this fact), or patients may be inappropriately focused on avoiding opioids increasing the 
risk that they would use extreme measures to address their pain. A person with unbearable pain 
could feel forced toward suicidality, particularly if they thought their pain was an immutable part 
of their life from then on. If an individual committed suicide after seeing his physician and failing 
to receive adequate pain control, could there be a basis for a malpractice lawsuit? Recommending 
adequate pain control is standard of care; failing to make that recommendation would seem to open 
a physician to suit, even if the existence of the patient’s VNOAD would ultimately serve as a 
defense. The VNOAD only addresses potential legal liability if the physician violates the 
VNOAD’s terms; it does not address the ethical and legal conflict a physician faces between the 
VNOAD and standard of care, or between the VNOAD and the patient’s well-being. 
 It is also not clear whether all physicians are mandated to upload a completed VNOAD 
when approached to do so. The obligation to upload the document is underneath the “Provider 
Responsibilities” category. The VNOAD document reads as follows, “If a health care practitioner 
receives a signed VNOAD form, it must be filed in the patient’s medical record and shall be 
transferred with the patient from one practitioner to another or from one health care facility to 
another.” Physicians only sign the VNOAD to indicate that they have uploaded the document, not 
to make it effective. The language “must be filed in a patient’s medical record,” creates an 
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obligation for the physician. It is not clear, however, whether physicians would be legally liable if 
they refused to upload the document.  
Further, it is not clear whether it would be ethical for a physician to refuse to continue to 
treat a patient if he or she has a VNOAD. Perhaps physicians could turn away patients, citing the 
ethical and legal bind in which VNOADs place them; however, this presents the usual ethical 
concerns that “firing” or refusing to treat a patient presents: concerns about patient abandonment, 
about undue pressures on patients to comply with physician wishes, and about groups of patients 
being “orphaned” by refusing physicians. In terms of firing pediatric patients due to families being 
refusers of infant vaccines, Dr. Stan Block notes legal liability in his reasoning to fire patients due 
to possible lawsuits from the families of other children that may become exposed to disease at his 
office. He writes, “we believe it is our ethical duty to tell all of our families that we have tried to 
vaccinate all of the children being seen in our office to the fullest extent possible according to the 
CDC vaccine schedule. We should be able to reassure all of our families that highly contagious 
infectious disease hazards…have been optimally minimized in our offices by our diligent vaccine 
efforts” (2015). While physicians with patients who have VNOADs are not at risk to be sued by 
other patients due to exposure, there may be lawsuits that come from the patient themselves or 
their families due to opioid complaints. Block reports that if appropriate measures are taken to 
transition care then a patient need not be “orphaned” but rather can still have continuous care. Dr. 
Mark Wicclair takes the position that “at best [dismissal of a patient is] in a gray zone of 
professional and unprofessional conduct and should be avoided” (2013). He notes the only 
substantial reason for dismissing a patient to be that the physician feels other doctors are better 
equipped to treat the patient due to the physician’s lack of clinical skills and/or substantial 
deficiencies in the patient-physician relationship leading to a counterproductive, destructive, 
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and/or harmful result. Even so, Dr. Wicclair notes that the physician ought to recommend another 
physician and facilitate the patient’s transfer. 
Furthermore, if the physician has strong reason to believe the patient either did not have 
capacity when signing the VNOAD into effect or was not fully informed of what it entailed, the 
physician may face an ethical quandary and experience distress. As in any other case (except 
emergency care) in which a physician believes the patient fails to understand the medical decision 
to which she or he is consenting, the physician has an ethical obligation to intervene and to attempt 
to inform the patient and elicit an informed consent or refusal. Yet the terms of the VNOAD 
preclude discussion of opioids, their risks and benefits, and the indications for their use, which 
would be necessary information for a person to make an informed decision regarding executing or 
affirming execution of a VNOAD. The physician is “between a rock and a hard place.” This gives 
rise to potential legal liability and stress. 
The medical field is already stressful, with estimates placing the percentage of physicians 
experiencing burnout in the United States at around 30 to 40 percent (Dyrbye & Shanafelt, 2011). 
If the use of VNOADs results in the aforementioned scenarios, they are likely to increase the level 
of burnout and emotional distress amongst physicians, resulting in more poor outcomes for all 
parties within the medical field. “Many aspects of patient care may be compromised by burnout. 
Physicians who have burnout are more likely to report making recent medical errors, score lower 
on instruments measuring empathy, and plan to retire early and have higher job dissatisfaction, 
which has been associated with reduced patient satisfaction with medical care and patient 
adherence to treatment plans” (Dyrbye, & Shanafelt, 2011). Not implementing NOADs within a 
healthcare system would avoid introducing an additional source of physician stress and burnout. 
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3.6  Family Distress  
Hospital visits are stressful events for patients, and stress also extends to family, 
particularly those who are charged with making medical decisions on behalf of patients who cannot 
make decisions themselves. To mitigate such stress people should be encouraged to make 
thoughtful and informed end-of-life decisions in advance of the need for them. Because observing 
a loved one suffer is especially distressing, it is particularly important to address how an 
individual’s pain should be managed toward the end-of-life and how to balance pain control with 
other patient values. “One in five Americans die using intensive care services. Therefore, ICU core 
competencies should include the provision of quality end-of-life care in addition to life-sustaining 
care” (Angus, 2004). Additionally, there is growing concern for “Post-Intensive Care Syndrome,” 
a syndrome characterized by the anxiety or depression in relatives resulting from acute stress 
during a family member’s hospitalization that may have resulted in death (Azoulay, 2012). 
Controlling a patient’s pain is an important way to mitigate family stress during a relative’s dying 
event, but the VNOAD may prevent adequate pain control and even prevent discussion of the 
possibility of using opioids.  
3.7 NOAD Appropriateness for West Virginia 
There is a question of the appropriateness of West Virginia’s VNOAD within West 
Virginia, because the VNOAD was practically wholly borrowed from Massachusetts. Some of its 
specific terminology, for example, is not clearly applicable to the citizens of West Virginia; for 
example, it uses the word ‘agent’ which is not recognized in West Virginia medico-legal language. 
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Another difference between Massachusetts and West Virginia may be even more important. 
WalletHub, a credit score and financial information site, publishes reports on jobs, the economy 
and financial matters. It ranked educational levels of states according to several parameters. 
Massachusetts ranked in at #1, while West Virginia ranked 49th. West Virginia came in 50th for 
the number of adults with college experience or bachelor’s degrees, and 48th for graduate degree 
holding adults (McCann, 2019). A state’s development and implementation of a NOAD should 
consider the health literacy within the population the document is likely to be used. Specifically, 
regarding West Virginia, there should be consideration of whether special care should be taken 
when addressing SUD in with the context of poverty and low education level. 
The use of a NOAD document may not be appropriate in WV if its implementation does 
not take sufficient account of the vulnerability of populations, or characteristics like 
impoverishment and low education level that are correlated with opioid drug use. Low levels of 
education may make it especially challenging for people to recognize the long-term broad 
implications of executing the VNOAD. The NOAD document may not present the same level of 
risk in Massachusetts, one of the most educated states in the country, because individuals there 
may look at the document with greater skepticism. One safeguard would be for West Virginia—
indeed, for any state—to mandate that a physician-patient discussion take place prior to allowing 
a person to execute a NOAD and prior to a physician certifying it. A second safeguard would be 
to eliminate the ease with which parties other than the patient can sign a VNOAD into place.  
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3.8 Populations Likely to be Affected by a VNOAD 
3.8.1  Opioid Allergy Population 
Although the VNOAD was developed primarily for use by individuals with SUD, other 
patient populations may be attracted to executing a VNOAD. For patients with an opioid allergy, 
executing a VNOAD might seem to be beneficial, but is also likely unnecessary and suboptimal. 
While patients with an opioid allergy could benefit from having their medical record flagged to 
avoid the prescription or administration of opioids to them, there are other means of achieving this 
result. Their allergy could and should be recorded in their medical record. Moreover, with the 
existence of allergy bracelets and allergy alerts on medical order interfaces, the VNOAD for this 
indication seems unnecessary.  
While execution of a VNOAD may achieve the result of avoiding receipt of opioids, other 
means are more appropriate, particularly because having a VNOAD is associated with having 
SUD. Thus, having a VNOAD could mark a person as having a SUD and result in stigmatization. 
Moreover, in the medical setting where balancing of pain control and patient management or 
outcome is important, there should be a clear delineation of the levels of risk and the severity of 
the patient’s opioid-induced allergic reaction, which should be balanced against the severity of 
pain and health-related responses. Importantly, “morphine causes the release of histamine, 
frequently resulting in itching, but this is not an allergic reaction. True allergy to opioid agents 
(e.g. anaphylaxis) is not common but does occur” (Utah Department of Health, 2008). 
Furthermore, “generally, [an] allergy to one opioid agent does not mean the patient is allergic to 
[all] opioids; switching to an agent in another opioid drug class may [also prove] be effective” 
(Utah Department of Health, 2008). The VNOAD in such a case would not allow for other 
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beneficial paths to be discussed and optimal pain relief reached. However, an allergy alert would 
be more effective as it would trigger clinical judgment and patient-physician discussion, whereas 
the VNOAD stops it. Additionally, it is important to note that allergies may not have been recorded 
accurately, and clinicians should be free to determine whether a patient may eventually benefit 
from opioid intervention. In a scenario where opioid pain medication is indicated, it would be best 
to allow for a patient-physician discussion, which the VNOAD does not. For patients without 
clearly documented evidence of an opioid allergy, the VNOAD’s complete restriction of opioid 
medication may prove more restrictive than beneficial. Thus, the VNOAD is actually a poor tool 
to address the needs of the opioid-allergic population and most likely inferior to current standard 
hospital measures already in place for patients with allergies. 
3.8.2  Patients without SUD who Fear Addiction 
For individuals who neither currently have, nor have historically had SUD, use of the 
VNOAD will likely be of only minimal (if any) benefit to avoid addiction or SUD. Instead, 
clinicians’ following prescribing practice guidelines and counseling patients in regard to pain 
medication would better serve such individuals. SUD is a chronic illness that can often be avoided 
with proper pain management. It is important for physicians to help people understand the 
difference between acute pain and chronic pain, differences in their treatment, and the chances of 
developing SUD as a result of treating acute versus chronic pain. Ironically, avoiding appropriate 
opioid medication during a time of acute pain could potentially lead to chronic pain and greater 
need of opioid usage or use of higher dosages. Undertreated or untreated acute post-operative pain 
has been suggested to increase the patient’s risk of developing chronic pain (Kehlet, Jensen, & 
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Woolf, 2006; Anson, 2016). Thus, there is health-related risk attending people’s execution of 
VNOADs because they fear addition.  
Executing a VNOAD is like bringing a shotgun instead of a key to open a door. It is very 
much jumping the gun. Individuals using a VNOAD to avoid SUD may not realize the instrument’s 
full implications. Signing a VNOAD results in lack of access to opioid pain control for terminal 
disease, post-surgical pain, and emergency scenarios. It is likely that the individual trying to avoid 
addiction is not considering such scenarios or is not accurately weighing the relative risks of SUD 
and intense or intractable pain. They may be acting out of fear of the much-publicized ill-effects 
of opioid misuse, or they just want their physician to be more deliberate about avoiding opioids 
when not absolutely necessary. For these patients, their executing a VNOAD cannot be considered 
an informed refusal of opioids or an informed advance directive regarding their future care. 
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4.0 Suggestions for Moving Forward 
The VNOAD is an ethically problematic measure to address opioid misuse within the 
healthcare system and broader society. Having to accept the VNOAD as a reality, as well as 
desiring to mitigate harms toward those currently using the document, it is possible to suggest 
some measures to mitigate the harm of the VNOAD as currently designed and implemented. 
First, a thorough physician-patient discussion should be required. This discussion should 
be required prior to the VNOAD being executed. The guidelines for the discussion should 
incorporate an acknowledgement of the VNOAD’s preempting of any future discussion of opioids 
as a treatment option, even when medically indicated, as well as helping the patient appreciate how 
pain can affect quality of life and health. It should include discussion of how the failure to use 
opioids may be detrimental within the treatment of patients with SUD, as well as the benefits of 
avoiding their use. The discussion should also acknowledge stigma that the document may carry.  
The discussion should also describe how the VNOAD may be revoked, and conditions under which 
its revocation would be advisable. Second, only the incompetence (decisional incapacity) of the 
patient (person who is the subject of the NOAD) should permit someone other than the patient to 
execute a NOAD. Only if the patient lacks decisional capacity should she or he not be aware of 
the VNOAD. Third, within regulations creating the possibility of a NOAD, there should be 
stipulation of conditions or scenarios under which the VNOAD would be automatically revoked 
or voided. These scenarios that would automatically void the VNOAD should be thoroughly 
discussed with the patient or surrogate. 
Requiring a thorough physician-patient discussion of the risks, potential benefits, and 
limitations of the VNOAD would benefit those using the VNOAD by promoting their autonomy 
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by helping to ensure that they give their voluntary informed consent to its execution. A thorough 
physician-patient discussion is also crucial for those seeking to employ the VNOAD because of 
their actual or presumed opioid allergy. In this case, the discussion should emphasize alternative 
approaches to ensuring that they are not administered opioids. Finally, a thorough physician-
patient discussion may dissuade those fearful of developing SUD from executing a VNOAD, 
because it may lead them to realize that when opioids are prescribed appropriately and their use is 
well monitored, their likelihood of developing a substance use disorder is much less than they 
perceive. For each population—those with SUD, those who fear SUD, and those with an opioid 
allergy—it is critical for patients to recognize the role of opioids in pain management (and indeed, 
in SUD treatment) and the importance of managing pain and other extreme discomfort, as well as 
to develop a realistic view of the risk of developing or exacerbating SUD and the limited role of a 
VNOAD in addressing this concern. No physician should allow a patient to execute a VNOAD 
and submit it for inclusion in his or her medical record without making certain that a thorough 
discussion took place. 
In cases when a surrogate executes a VNOAD, it must be ensured that the patient is at least 
aware that a VNOAD exists, save for patients deemed persistently incompetent. An easy way to 
facilitate this would be to make a mandatory policy that the patient be in the room when the 
VNOAD is signed into effect by a surrogate. A VNOAD executed by a surrogate should be 
revisited with a patient if the patient regains decisional capacity. Execution of a VNOAD by a 
surrogate should be a rare event, and should be permitted only in consultation with the patient’s 
physician and only in the rare instances when executing the VNOAD is arguably in the patient’s 
best interest or is in-keeping with the patient’s values or wishes stated while still competent  
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Finally, there should be stipulated conditions, criteria, or medical scenarios that nullify a 
previously executed VNOAD, so that at least the discussion of opioids with the patient may be 
initiated by the physician. Scenarios that may be valid for automatic revocation or nullification of 
the VNOAD should include emergencies when opioid use is medically indicated, when death is 
imminent and opioids are necessary to promote quality of life while the patient is dying, when 
cancer-pain is unmanageable without opioids, in the case of post-surgical procedures that cause or 
are likely to cause intense pain, and when a patient has dementia and management of symptoms 
(e.g., pain, discomfort) is of greater concern than the patient’s development of SUD or risk of SUD 
relapse. Importantly, the VNOAD being automatically nullified does not take away the patient’s 
(or proxy’s) right to refuse the opioid intervention. Instead, automatic nullification or revocation 
merely allows the physician to recommend the medication as he or she may deem fit or necessary. 
Stipulation of conditions under which the VNOAD is nullified would benefit those seeking to use 
the VNOAD to address their SUD or concern about development of SUD, by separating the 
chronic condition of SUD from acute conditions in which patients may benefit from short-term, 
well-monitored opioid use.  
Michigan has employed such measures in its recent creation of a NOAD (figure 3). In 
Michigan, the NOAD is inactivated in emergency scenarios. The Michigan form (see figure 3)  
states, “this directive does not apply to… a patient [who] is being treated at a hospital, or in a 
setting outside of a hospital in the case of an emergency, and, in the prescriber’s professional 
opinion, the administration of the opioid is medically necessary to treat the individual.” Clearly, 
an emergency is a time of crisis, it is acute, and stabilization of a patient is the predominant issue. 
Another appropriate time for a NOAD to be inapplicable is toward the end of life or when death 
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is imminent. At that time, a conversation about the appropriate balance between pain control and 
other patient values should be initiated by the physician.  
Further, when a patient is diagnosed with cancer and either the cancer itself or surgery is 
likely to occasion severe pain, a physician should not just be permitted, but should be required to 
discuss whether the patient with a NOAD wants to affirm it, i.e., to have it remain effective. This 
discussion can be initiated without specifically talking about, offering, or recommending opioids. 
The focus of the discussion can be, at least initially, whether the patient wants to maintain his or 
her NOAD. There is a substantial proportion of individuals suffering from cancer who require 
opioids to manage pain; it is estimated that about two-thirds of cancer patients in pain would have 
opioids indicated as part of the 3rd step on the WHO analgesic ladder (Rajagopal, et al., 2007). In 
addition, as cancer brings closer an ever more imminent death for the individual it is possible that 
their alignment of goals no longer has opioid avoidance or mitigation of SUD as higher than pain 
control. Particularly because SUD is a chronic condition, which terminally ill patients may not 
develop (or are likely not to care about if they are in hospice, for example), discussion of whether 
they want to continue to refuse opioids should not be overly concerning. Physicians’ duties to 
reduce suffering and promote patient well-being support aggressive pain management, including 
opioid use, toward the end of life.     
Furthermore, post-surgical procedures likely to cause intense pain should also be grounds 
for automatic VNOAD revocation or nullification, because intense pain can lead to a higher 
likelihood of post-surgical complications as well a slower healing process. In addition, 
undertreating or not treating acute pain can also lead to a higher likelihood of developing chronic 
pain.  
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Dementia should also be a condition that leads to the automatic revocation or nullification 
of a VNOAD. For patients with severe dementia, the reasons that led them to execute a VNOAD 
may no longer apply, or they may no longer be aware of them. Addiction may no longer be a fear. 
Concern about SUD relapse may no longer be relevant. Dementia is a terminal condition, though 
the process toward death may take a long time. Patients with severe dementia are likely to be well-
monitored, either in a skilled nursing facility or at home by informal caregivers and family. It is 
highly unlikely that such a regulated environment would lead to SUD in the patient, and even if 
so, the team can carefully manage the patient to ween appropriately. Patients with dementia may 
have therapeutic reasons for opioids, such as discomfort, and their current interests in mitigating 
pain and discomfort are likely to outweigh previously expressed interests in living opioid-free. It 
is important that patients with dementia have as good a quality of life as can be offered, and without 
opioid use agitation may ensue and physical restraints or restrictions on movement may be 
employed, thereby reducing the person’s quality of life. To promote the patient’s quality of life 
and dignity, it is important to avoid such restraints and restrictions as much as possible, even if 
opioids need to be administered. 
Lastly, insofar as a VNOAD was created to aid in SUD treatment, a person executing a 
VNOAD should not result in restriction of opioid usage needed as part of SUD therapy. The 
Michigan NOAD, for example, specifically states that the document does not apply in the context 
of SUD treatment. SUD clinics rely heavily on creating an environment conducive to healthcare, 
emphasizing strong patient-centered care. The VNOAD undermines the goals of these healthcare 
facilities, such as methadone clinics. As the West Virginian VNOAD is currently written, it is 
incompatible with therapies requiring the use of opioid substances. There is also a danger that 
increased usage of the VNOAD begins to invalidate therapies like buprenorphine or suboxone 
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treatment in the public opinion. This would be especially unfortunate because, as Harris and 
McElrath (2012) suggest, “social control and institutional stigma create the conditions for poor 
outcomes with [methadone therapy].” They cite factors such as arbitrary rules within certain 
healthcare settings and patients feeling that they are being held in contempt by healthcare personnel 
as examples of what may result in poor patient outcomes. If the popularity of VNOADs further 
stigmatize the use of methadone, buprenorphine, or suboxone, the underlying goal of the 
instrument’s development—to reduce SUD and deaths due to opioids—would be undermined. 
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Figure 3 Michigan NonOpioid Directive Image 
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5.0 Conclusion 
Overall, the West Virginia VNOAD is a poor instrument, and its employment should be 
met with skepticism. Physicians should advise against patients’ use of them. The VNOAD disrupts 
physician-patient communication, increases several aforementioned risks for patients in the 
healthcare setting, and undermines patient autonomy. Having a VNOAD may itself be stigmatizing 
even for those without SUD, and for those with SUD having a VNOAD may undermine SUD 
treatment protocols in which opioids are used to treat patients. The document does not further 
patients’ overall healthcare goals, and conditions for its revocation are not clearly delineated. The 
document not only affects patients, but also affects physicians and other clinicians by potentially 
increasing their distress both as a result of the liability exposure the document presents to 
physicians prevented from providing standard of care and because of the stress clinicians 
experience watching patients suffer pain that they are prevented from attempting to control 
effectively. Likewise, families may experience distress in scenarios in which the patient is 
experiencing a great deal of pain without appropriate pain medication.  
For states considering the implementation of a NOAD they would be wise to  mandate that 
there be a thorough physician-patient discussion prior to execution of the document, as well as a 
process to ensure that only if a patient is incompetent (lacks decisional capacity) may a NOAD be 
executed by others without the patient’s participation and consent. The physician-patient 
discussion—with the patient or with a surrogate if the patient lacks decisional capacity—should 
include discussion of contexts in which prescription of opioids is standard of care and alternatives 
to opioids if they exist, as well as disclosure of contexts in which there may be no effective 
alternative to opioid use. The physician should explain how pain can affect both quality of life and 
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health status, and how execution of a NOAD may and may not contribute to avoidance of 
development of SUD or SUD relapse. The physician should make a recommendation regarding 
how the document could benefit the patient or explain why he or she believes it is not indicated. 
The physician should disclose that the document may itself be stigmatizing by leading others to 
view the patient as having the stigmatizing condition of SUD. States should also stipulate scenarios 
in which the NOAD is automatically revoked (e.g., to allow discussion of the document after a 
cancer diagnosis, to allow appropriate pain management following surgical procedures likely to 
cause intense pain, and to afford appropriate comfort measures for patients diagnosed with 
dementia, and environments in which the NOAD’s application would be restricted (e.g., in 
dementia or hospice care, or in SUD treatment). These measures may mitigate the harms otherwise 
done by use of NOADs. 
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